Measuring Campaign Intensity
In order to assess the impact of campaigning, some measure of campaign intensity that can be applied across parties and constituencies is required. Johnston and colleagues have used campaign expenditure as a surrogate indicator, the assumption being that the more money a party spends in a constituency the stronger is its campaign and vice versa, while Seyd and
Whiteley have used surveys of party members to estimate the activism of constituency organisations. Clearly, however, both of these are very indirect measures of campaign intensity.
Our studies of campaigning in the 1992, 1997 and 2001 general elections, on the other hand, have been based on nation-wide postal surveys of election agents -the people who organize and direct constituency campaigns -which asked them to provide details of their party's campaign in their constituency. 4 This approach is not without difficulties, of course -we have to rely on respondents remembering the details and being honest, for example, and to concentrate mainly on activities during the 'short' campaign, even though local campaigning now begins well in advance of an election. Nonetheless, on the basis of the information provided by agents we have been able to construct various indices measuring the strength of the constituency campaigns conducted by the parties and have used these measures to analyse electoral effects. Our approach has the advantage of yielding direct measures of campaign intensity -being based on what actually happens on the ground in a constituency campaignrather than surrogates. Using our various indices we can compare campaign intensity across parties, across constituencies and, to some extent at least, in different elections.
In constructing our original campaign intensity index we used numerous variables from our surveys to create new variables measuring activity on seven dimensions of campaigningpreparation, organisation, manpower, canvassing, leafleting, use of computers and the polling day operation. A principal components analysis of these seven variables generated one factor and factor scores for each case. These factor scores then constituted a standardized campaign strength score, with an overall mean of zero (for details see Denver and Hands, 1997: 246-55 ). However, this original index of campaign intensity was devised with a very traditional constituency campaign in mind, and did not include measures of more modern techniques, such as telephone canvassing and direct mail. We have therefore expanded and up-dated the index to do this, and the scores that this produces for the 2001 general election (recalculated, for ease of comprehension, so that the mean score for all cases is 100) are shown in Table 2 .
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Variations in the intensity with which parties campaign across constituencies are considerable and produced by a number of factors, but by far the most important factor is the electoral status of the constituency -in particular, whether or not it has been 'targeted' by a party. All parties now identify target seats -those where there is a possibility that they might win (if challenging) or lose (if they are the incumbent) -and focus their resources and expertise on them. Table 2 shows the mean campaign intensity scores for each party in three types of seat in 2001. 6 The figures suggest that, overall, the Conservatives had the strongest campaigns in the 2001 election, with Labour a little behind. As in previous elections, the Liberal Democrats had much the weakest campaigns overall, but when it came to targeting they were very effective. The strongest campaigns of all were in Labour targets, though the campaigns in Conservative and Liberal Democrat targets were only a little less strong. It is noticeable that Conservative campaigns in their safest seats were also fairly strong, but weaker than in their target seats. In fact this represents something of a breakthrough for Conservative campaign strategists, since in previous elections their strongest campaigns have been in their safest seats, which was not an optimal distribution of campaign resources. The change in 2001 is the fruit of a long learning and teaching process that was undertaken in the party in the aftermath of 1997. The Impact of Constituency Campaigning When attempting to analyse the impact of campaigning on election results, it is clear that some measure of campaign intensity must be the independent variable -and here we use the updated index described above -and that some measure of party performance must be the dependent variable. What is not clear is how party performance should be measured.
Perhaps the most obvious measures of party performance to use in this context are changes in the share of the votes and of the electorate obtained as compared with the previous election.
The meaning of both measures is easy to appreciate and they are simple to calculate. In their original work, Denver and Hands (1997: 276-8) argued that the change in share of votes received is actually an indirect consequence of the primary aim of campaigning -maximising the number of votes received -and that change in the share of the electorate was the more appropriate measure of party performance. Nonetheless, initially we look at both measures. and change in share of the vote being -0.42), though in the case of the Liberal Democrats the effect was a good deal less strong (the correlation coefficient being -0.16). However, the Conservatives tended to improve most in vote share terms where they were already stronger and least where they had previously been weaker (coefficient of +0.20). Whatever the interpretation one puts on these effects, the impact of a party's previous strength or weakness can be taken into account in analysis by calculating partial correlation coefficients measuring the association between campaign intensity and share of vote or electorate in the election concerned while controlling for share in the previous election. The relevant coefficients are shown in the second part of Table 3 overall change of +1.6 per cent. On the assumption that these differences were not a product of regional differences in campaigning but reflected some other regional effects, we control for region in subsequent analyses.
The second variable to be incorporated is incumbency. There is clear evidence that, in general, incumbent MPs tend to do better in terms of vote change in successive general elections then do new candidates (Norton and Wood, 1992) . In particular, 'first-time incumbents' -that is those who won the seat for the first time at the preceding electionfrequently experience a 'second-time surge' in support. The explanation usually given for this phenomenon is that at the first election the new candidate would almost always be replacing a well-established MP, likely to be well-known in the constituency. By the time of the second election the new MP would have had a chance to make his or her mark -becoming better-known through the local media, helping constituents with problems and so on.
Whatever the reason, incumbency is certainly a local constituency influence on election outcomes.
Having made major gains in 1997, Labour and the Liberal Democrats had many more firsttime incumbents than usual in 2001 (and the Conservatives relatively few) and the expected incumbency effects are evident in the changes in vote shares obtained by Conservative and
Liberal Democrat candidates. The overall change in vote share for Conservative nonincumbents was +0.5 per cent (N=500) while for all incumbents it was +2.8 per cent (N=139) and for those who were first-time incumbents it was +3.1 per cent (N=49). Table 4 . We repeated this analysis using first-time incumbency (rather than incumbency itself) as a predictor variable. In each case first-time incumbency is significant and the effect of including this variable is to reduce the size of the coefficient for campaign intensity. Indeed, in the case of the Conservatives the campaigning variable now becomes non-significant.
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How is this to be interpreted? We suggested above that incumbency is clearly a constituency-level factor affecting election results and we would argue that first-time incumbency can be interpreted as itself a campaigning effect. It is not the simple fact of being a first-time incumbent that affects voters but what the new incumbent has done after being first elected. In this context it is not dealing with individual constituents' problems that is important -even the most assiduous MP can only be in contact with a fraction of the electorate for this purpose and he or she is likely to disappoint a proportion of these -but getting publicity in local media, meeting groups of voters, holding meetings and improving the party organisation. In short, this amounts to campaigning. Indeed, after 1997 Labour's new incumbents were strongly encouraged by the party to devote a lot of time to their constituencies -even to the extent of being absent from Westminster on a regular and planned basis for the purpose, since their votes were not required in the House. Moreover, the videos that Labour distributed in 60 priority seats towards the end of the 2001 campaign strongly trumpeted the achievements of the local MPs, who had all been first elected in 1997. We suggest, therefore, that in all parties the 'second-time surge' gained by first-time incumbents in 2001 is actually a longer-term campaigning effect and strengthens rather than weakens the argument that constituency campaigning makes a difference.
Thus far, we have been concerned with the effects of each party's campaign upon its own performance. Parties do not campaign in isolation, however. All mount some sort of campaign in every constituency. Focusing on constituencies for which we have campaign intensity scores for all three parties, Table 5 shows the extent to which, across constituencies, the strength of the parties' campaigning efforts were inter-related. As can be seen, variations in campaign intensity on the part of the Conservatives and Labour were not significantly related but the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats tended to campaign strongly or weakly in the broadly the same constituencies, reflecting the fact that in many seats they were in close competition while in safe Labour seats they were both out of the running. On the other hand, Labour and Liberal Democrat campaign intensities were negatively related. Where
Labour campaigned strongly the Liberal Democrats tended to be weak and vice versa. This is partly a product of the structure of party competition in different constituencies, but it may also reflect an on-the-ground understanding that Labour would go easy where the Liberal Democrats were challenging Conservatives while the Liberal Democrats would return the favour in closely fought Conservative v Labour contests. In any event, it seems likely that a party's performance will also be affected by the campaigns of the other competing parties. In addition, their own results might be affected by whether or not they are campaigning against an incumbent MP. In Table 6 , therefore, we present the results of further multiple regression analyses based on these constituencies. This enables us simultaneously to take account of the campaigns of all three parties and assess their effect on the performances of their opponents as well as their own. We include all three intensity scores in the equations, as well as the incumbency status of each party's candidate. Regional dummy variables were also included as before but coefficients are not reported in the table for the sake of clarity.
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In these cases, the effects of Conservative incumbency remained a significant positive influence on the party's performance and also tended to reduce Labour support (but not that of the Liberal Democrats). Labour incumbency had no significant effect at all, but Liberal
Democrat incumbents not only increased their own electorate share significantly but also reduced the share obtained by Labour. The latter might be a reflection of some erstwhile Labour supporters making a tactical switch to the Liberal Democrats in order to ensure that the incumbent held the seat. As far as campaigning is concerned, the analyses again suggest that Conservative campaigning had a significant impact on support for the party. It had no effect, however, on the performance of the other parties whereas Labour and Liberal 
Notes: The coefficients shown are unstandardized. The campaign intensity scores have been divided by 100 so that the scale is close to those for the incumbency and regional variables. Only coefficients that are statistically significant (p< 0.05) are shown.
As before, we repeated these analyses using first-time incumbency for all three parties, rather than simple incumbency, as predictor variables. Once again the effect was to reduce the size of the coefficients describing the impact of campaign intensity on each party's own vote, with the Conservative coefficient becoming non-significant. 13 As above, we would suggest that the first-time incumbency variables are to some extent acting as surrogate indicators of campaign intensity.
Conclusion
The evidence that we have presented on the effects of constituency campaigning is not as clear-cut for the 2001 general election as it was for 1992 and 1997. In the latter, no matter which dependent variable was used and irrespective of the kinds of analysis undertaken, there was little evidence of Conservative campaigning affecting the party's performance but it was clear that stronger Labour and Liberal Democrat campaigning in the constituencies produced better election outcomes for these parties. This analysis of the 2001 data has produced results that are less easy to interpret. In no case were variations in the simple change in the share of the vote obtained by a party significantly related to variations in the intensity of its campaigns and for all three parties more intense campaigning was associated with steeper falls in their shares of the electorate. When we took account of previous vote, however, Labour and Liberal Democrat campaigning did have a positive effect on performance but Conservative campaigning did not. When additional controls for region and incumbency were introduced in multiple regression analyses, however, campaigning proved to be significant for all three parties. Moreover, in cases where we were able also to control for the strength of campaigns mounted by the other parties and whether or not opposing candidates were incumbents, campaigning by each party significantly affected its own performance and, in the case of Labour and the Liberal Democrats, the performance of the other party. Labour may find it even harder to mobilize supporters, the Liberal Democrats will be further stretched over a larger number of seats and the Conservatives will again have to aim to recapture a large number of seats. Resolving these problems will not be easy for any of the parties but, given the evidence presented here, it seems likely that the ways in which constituency campaigns are organized at national level and the strength of campaigning on the ground will once again have a significant effect on the election outcome. 
4.
The surveys covered Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat, SNP and Plaid Cymru agents.
The overall response rates from the three main parties were 53.0% in 1992, 68.5% in 1997 and 65.6% in 2001.
5.
The expansion of the index involves adding two new campaign dimensions -one relating to targeting of leaflets and use of direct mail and the other concerning the use of telephones for canvassing (both before and during the campaign) and knocking up. In addition, the preparation dimension is extended to include the extent of use of previous canvass records and the extent to which voter identification had been undertaken in the pre-campaign period.
The canvassing dimension now takes the percentage of the electorate canvassed by telephone into account; the use of party software is added to computers and the polling day dimension also includes whether volunteers were sent into the constituency from neighbouring seats.
6. The numbers of responses on which the data in Table 2 9.
In the aftermath of the election there was much comment on how well Labour's first time incumbents had done. This impression was created by focussing on the seats that Labour had gained in 1997 and in these the decline in vote share was indeed smaller than in other seats (-0.5 per cent, N=144). However, there were a number of new candidates in 1997 in seats that
Labour already held who were also first-time incumbents in 2001 and the change in their overall vote share was -2.1 per cent (N=51).
10.
The estimates for each party are calculated by applying the coefficients for campaign intensity to the mean of the twenty worst and twenty best intensity scores for each party. 
